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The Albanian-American Community in the United States :  
A Diaspora Coming to Visibility1 
Nadège Ragaru and Amilda Dymi* 
 
 
The Albanian-American community in the United States became visible at 
the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the Spring of 1999. The US 
government had promised to shelter 20,000 Kosovars expelled from their 
homeland by Serb-dominated Yugoslav forces (Michael Kranish and Mary 
Leonard, 1999). As refugees hit American soil, stories of family reunion and 
community solidarity were told in the local and national press. True, there had 
been earlier rallies in Washington organized by Albanian-American 
organizations that had hinted at the wish, on the part of the Albanian 
immigrants, to weigh upon US foreign policy towards the Balkans. Yet the by the 
end of the 1990s 200,000 to 400,000 Albanians remained little known to the 
average American public2. As the Kosovo events receded into the background, 
the upsurge of interest faded away. To this day, the literature on the geographic 
location, social belonging, internal differentiation and identity-bulding of the 
Albanian-American community remains scanty. In particular, no academic 
research has addressed the dynamics of this new diaspora beyond occasional 
journalistic coverage of crime and gang-related issues in the New York area.  
 
As early as 1988, Dennis Nagi, a second generation Albanian and one of 
the few scholars who attempted to document the history of the Albanian-
American community in the United States, lamented the scarcity of data on the 
rather recent diaspora3. Twenty years later, little progress has been made: Unlike 
the older Greek and Italian colonies4, or even the Croat and the Serb diaspora5, 
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the Albanians have failed to attract sustained attention6. Although – or perhaps, 
because - little is known about Albanians in the US, demonizing pictures of its 
supposed compelling influence on American politics have been flourishing. 
Xavier Raufer’s controversial work on La mafia albanaise bears witness to such a 
stereotyping process. His presentation of Albanian political lobbying focuses 
nearly exclusively on the role former Congressman James Traficant is said to 
have played in convincing the US to support the Albanian rebel mouvement in 
19997. Building upon the dubious – and well documented – past of this unique 
figure, the author makes a case for denouncing the connivences between the 
Albanian mafia, the Italian mafia, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK, Ushtria 
çlirimtare e Kosovës) and the Congress. While connections of this kind may well 
have existed, such a presentation offers a very skewed perspective on the 
Albanians in the US and of their attempts at garnering support for intervention. 
Beyond this particular work, Balkan diasporas have been typically perceived as a 
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major tool of ethnonationalistic radicalization with the distance from the 
motherland accounting for the extreme reappropriation of an often half-forgotten 
national identity. To what extent this pattern may be applied to the Albanians in 
the US is a question worth asking.  
 
Against this background, the present paper aims to offer some insights 
into the socio-history of the Albanians in America, their location, community life 
and ethnic organizations, with a particular stress on the changes brought about 
by the opening up of Albania’s borders after 1990 and the crisis in Kosovo that 
culminated at the time of the NATO airstrikes in March-June 1999. Both events 
have paved the way for a stepping up of Albanian immigration to America and 
provoked major identity and political realignments within the Albanian 
community. Our focus, therefore, will be both on the ethnic processes prompted 
by the changing situation in the Balkans and on the emergence of Albanian-
Americans as a political actor in American policy-process. In order to address 
these issues, we will proceed in several steps. In section one, we will try to 
conduct a brief assessment of the state of our knowledge about the Albanian 
American population in the country – putting into perspective the major waves 
of immigration and the geographic distribution of the newcomers. Early attempts 
at political lobbying will be studied in a second section, that will concentrate on 
the period between 1989 and the Albanian uprising in Kosovo. The third and 
final section will further detail the role played by the diaspora during the 1998-
1999 conflict in Kosovo, both in terms of influencing policy-making in the United 
states and in providing assistance to refugees. An attempt will also be made at 
assessing the overall impact of the Balkan crises on the structuring and 
community-awareness of the Albanians in America. 
 
  
I. The Albanian American Community: History of a Settlement 
 
Albanian emigration to the United States started in the late XIXth Century, 
albeit at a very slow pace. The first wave of Albanian immigrants came from 
Korça and other areas of southern Albania. They were predominantly orthodox 
young males who hoped to return home after they made money on the new 
continent (Dennis L.Nagi, 1988, p.32-33). Their main center was Boston and the 
Greater Boston area. By 1907, several hundreds Albanians worked in the mills of 
New England, in newfound factories (shoe, wood, leather,etc.) or in restaurants 
and hotels. At that time, an unofficial census suggested the following break-
down: Boston, seven hundred, Worcester and Southbridge four hundred, and 
Natick two hundred (Dennis L.Nagi, 1988, p.35). Until the late seventies, Boston 
was to remain the major center of Albanian immigration in the United States.  
 
As was the case with other European immigrant communities who came 
from stateless nations at the turn of the Century – such as the Poles, Lithuanians, 
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Slovaks, Croatians or Slovenians -, the experience abroad was to play an 
important role in the nurturing of a national movement and distinctive collective 
identity among the Albanians (Dennis L.Nagi, 1988, p.6). At that time, indeed, 
the lands that were to make up the state of Albania were still under Ottoman 
dominion –independence was not to be achieved until 1912 and recognized at 
the London Conference in November 1913 -, and the emergence of a national 
feeling among the local population had been hampered by the weakness of the 
urban and educated elite. Most of the early Albanian immigrants who reached 
the US had a rural background and little knowledge of literary Albanian. A 
minority of the émigrés, however, had received education and was to agitate for 
independence at home. It is in Boston, for instance, that the first Albanian weekly 
newspaper, Kombi (The Nation), began publication in 1906. Its founder, Sotir 
Peci, a graduate of the university of Athens was instrumental in instilling a sense 
of Albanianhood among his fellow nationals and in encouraging the spread of 
literacy in Albanian. Beside him, several major figures of the Albanian national 
movement were active in the US diaspora. The most prominent is undoubtedly 
Fan S.Noli, an Albanian immigrant from Qytezë in Eastern Thrace (and future 
Harvard graduate) who settled in Boston in 1906, was to be ordained priest two 
years later, and set up the first autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church in 
1908. At that time, no such Church existed in the Ottoman empire8. In 1907, F. 
Noli founded Besa-Besen (Word of Honor), the second Albanian-American 
organization9, whose support was key to the creation of Dielli (Sun), a weekly 
newspaper launched on February 15, 1909 and committed to the popularization 
of the cause of Albanian independence. Eventually Fan Noli returned to Albania 
in 1921, and headed the governement set up after the ephemeral June Democratic 
Revolution (June 10, 1924)10. Unrecognized by West European powers and the 
UN, Noli’s governement was forced out by Ahmed Zogu on December 24, 1924, 
when his armed forces entered Tirana. F. Noli then settled in the United States 
definitely and devoted most of his energy to the development of the Albanian 
Orthodox Archdiocese whose metropolitan he was to remain until his death in 
1965. One of his most active friends and supporters was Faik Konica, the 
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descendant of a wealthy Albanian Moslem family (educated in the Ottoman 
empire and in France) who emigrated to Boston in 1909 to become Dielli’s editor-
in-chief. In the 1930s, Konica was to become King Zog’s minister to America 
(Skendi, 1967, pp.156-159). 
 
The nineteen twenties saw a first major shift in the nature of Albanian 
immigration to the US. Access to independence had led some émigrés back to 
Albania. Yet to most of them, the first years of sovereign state brought bitter 
frustrations. Economic difficulties and the hope for a better future convinced 
entire families and even at times entire villages to look for a permanent 
settlement in the United States. Although Albanian immigration increased 
during the ‘20s and ‘30s, it continued to come essentially from southern Albania, 
with only very few known cases of immigrants from the north of the country. 
The shift from a predominantly male-dominated emigration to a family pattern 
was accompanied by attempts at better integration within US society: While 
before 1920, only 6% of the immigrants had sworn the Oath of Citizenship in 
America, by 1930, they were 28% (Nagi, 1988, p.52).  
 
In parallel, Albanian-American organizations, which had been exerted a 
leaderhisp role in the political struggle for an independent Albania, started 
refocusing on American local issues once this goal was achieved. Charitable, 
cultural and educational activities came to the foreground, reflecting the wish of 
now permanent Albanian settlers to prosper in America. This evolution is 
evidenced in the case of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America-Vatra (Federata 
Pan-Shqiptare “Vatra”), which was started in April 1912 in Boston by Fan Noli 
and Faik Konica and was politically active during World War I. Following the 
creation of an Albanian Nation-State, it shifted its attention to helping young 
generations of Albanians get educated in the United States and become 
successfully integrated in America. A students’ scolarship fund was thus set up 
in 1921 (Constitution and By-Laws of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, 
Vatra, 1954). Several other community organizations shared a similar profile, 
such as the Albanian Ladies Union created in 1923 – which contributed to the 
reconstruction of Korça, in southern Albania, after the 1928 earthquake - and the 
Daughters of Saint George. 
 
This pattern of Albanian emigration  - mostly from Albania - came to a 
halt by the end of World War II, when the country’s borders were sealed by 
Enver Hoxha’s communist regime. Few are those who managed to cross over 
after 1944. The rare successful defectors often chose to establish themselves in 
Europe. Eventually, in the 1950s a small anti-communist group reached the 
United States, typically after a first stop in a European country11. Among them 
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were representatives of the major anti-communist parties – Partia e Legaliteti 
(Legality Party) and Balli Kombëtar (National Front) - who tried to denounce 
Albanian policies and to monopolize opposition to the new Albanian leader. By 
and large, for over fifty-five years, the biggest waves of Albanian immigrants 
were to come from Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. As a rule, also, the 
newcomers that arrived after World War II were more educated than the Boston 
forerunners from the beginning of the century.  
 
After 1960, Tito’s open border policies facilitated Yugoslav Albanians to 
settle down abroad. Most of them, however, preferred to go and work in Europe 
rather than to leave for distant USA. Yet this choice of destination was 
periodically reconsidered following social upheavals in Kosovo (1948, 1968, 1981, 
1989). In 1948, after the break-up between Albania and Tito’s Yugoslavia, Kosovo 
was held in suspicion by Yugoslav authorities, which feared that its Albanian 
population might be used as a fifth column by Hoxha’s communists (Malcolm, 
1998, pp.319-323; Ramet, 1992, p.188-189; Reuter, 1982, p.45). As a result, it was 
subjected to harsh control until the dismissal of head of Secret Police and 
minister of the Interior, Aleksandar Rankovic, in 1966, thus favoring chronic 
flows of emigrants. Yet, the pace of migration to the US increased mostly after 
1968. Several factors explain this trend. First, while the political situation of the 
Kosovars improved after the mid-1960s, from an economic standpoint their fate 
was not compelling. Industrialization (mostly under the form of heavy mineral-
based industries) did not bring about the expected improvement in the average 
standard of living of the population. In comparison with other regions in 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo still lagged behind (Roux, 1992, p.235-338). In adddition, 
from the 1960s onwards, the Albanian community in Kosovo underwent a 
demographic explosion that the resources of the province were not sufficient to 
accommodate. Unemployment remained high and the setting up of a university 
in Prishtina/Priština in 1970 ended up creating a new category of college 
educated students who did not find room for professional realization in their 
place of origin. From the early 1970s onwards, a new wave of Albanians from 
Kosovo left for America. They comprised Kosovars as well as some Albanians 
from Albania who had earlier sought refuge in the Yugoslav province.   
 
 The student demonstrations of 1981 and the brutal repression that ensued 
initiated a new phase in the history of Kosovo under Yugoslav rule. More 
Albanians decided to leave, some to Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, others 
to the United States and Canada. To this day, however, it remains difficult to 
assess how many Albanians arrived in America. Often they entered the United 
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States with Yugoslav or Turkish passports12. Others still were illegal and 
therefore not recorded. Statistical information remains rare. According to some 
estimates, around 45,000 Kosovars left the province between 1971 and 1981. 
What percentage reached the US cannot be ascertained. In 1981, the number of 
Albanians in the United States was estimated at around 70.000 people (Nagi, 
1988, p.25).   
 
 Events took on a more radical turn in 1989, after the autonomy of Kosovo 
was taken away by Slobodan Miloševic, then head of the Serbian communist 
party. The 1990s saw a dramatic worsening of the situation of Kosovars with 
mass job dismissals, increased police repression, and curtailment of collective 
rights (Roux, 1992, p.365 and follow.). New flows of migrants from former 
Yugoslavia ensued. Meanwhile, the demise of communism turned Albania into a 
country of high migratory potential. The world public became aware of the 
horrendous situation that prevailed there after decades of autarky in 1990, when 
thousands of Albanians besieged Western Embassies in Tirana to find a path 
abroad. Aborted economic reforms, high inflation and soaring unemployment all 
contributed to convince Albania’s relatively young population to search for 
alternatives beyond the confine of their homeland (Barjaba, 2000; Dhori Kule and 
al., 2000)13.  
 
Consequently, emigration to America witnessed a new boost. From 
Albania alone, in 1999, according to data provided by the Albanian Ministry of 
labor and social affairs, 12,000 Albanians left for the United States (12,000 for 
Germany and 5,000 for Canada) (Barjaba, 2000, p.59). These numbers cannot 
compare to the 200,000 Albanians who were estimated to be in Italy at the same 
time, even less so with the 500,000 immigrants in Greece (Barjaba, 2000, p.59). A 
representative survey conducted in 1998 at the initiative of the European Union, 
however, showed that 1,9 % of the 703 interviewees (out of 1,500 respondents) 
who declared they had emigrated at least once between 1990 and 1998, chose the 
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United States as their destination (vs. 56,0% Greece and 29,9% Italy) (Dhori Kule 
and al., 2000, p.14).  
 
 
II- Albanian Communities in 1999 : A Glimpse into Diaspora Life  
 
Before the 1999 war in Kosovo, the picture that emerged from these 
successive migratory moves was the following. Historically the biggest 
concentration of Albanians had been located in the Massachusetts area, namely 
Boston and Worcester. From there, Albanian immigrants had spread throughout 
the Atlantic coast states, as far West as Chicago. Nowadays settlements can be 
found in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Michigan and, to a 
lesser extent, in D.C., Virginia, Maryland, Florida, Texas and California, although 
there are small pockets of Albanian-American colonies elsewhere in the US. It is 
in the extended tri-state area of NY, NJ and CT that the Albanian community is 
expanding at the highest rate.  
 
 How many American citizens of Albanian descent currently reside in the 
United States is still difficult to determine. For at least two reasons – first, some 
of them came as illegal migrants and have not been officially registered; second, 
Albanians from Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia – whose citizenship was 
Yugoslavian until the break-up of the Federation - often hesitate between 
declaring themselves as Yugoslavians, as Turks or as Albanians. In his brief 
overview of the Albanian-American community, Fron Nazi quotes unofficial 
estimates of between 250,000 and 500,000 Albanian-Americans14. The results 
obtained from the 2000 Census Supplementary Survey about ancestry are much 
more conservative15. Although they should be treated with caution, they provide 
some picture of the Albanian communities in the US. In 2000, the number of 
Albanians  was estimated at 107.310 (anywhere between 87,048 - lower bound - 
and 127,572 -higher bound-). Meanwhile, 288,347 people claimed Yugoslavian 
ancestors (between 260,238 and 316,456). Since there were separate categories for 
“Croatian” and “Serbian”, it might be hypothesized that these comprise mostly 
Montenegrins, Bosnians and Kosovars. (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 – Ancestry-First Reported – Census 2000 Supplementary Survey 
Summary Tables 
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United States 
 
Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Total 273,643,274 - - 
Albanian 107,310 87,048 127,572 
Croatian 258,733 238,682 278,784 
Serbian 99,413 86,002 112,824 
Yugoslavian 288,347 260,238 316,456 
 
Source: US Bureau of the Census - Census 2000 
 
In fact, by the end of the 1980s the older Albanian-American community 
in Massachussets had entered a process of slow desintegration. The forcible 
disruption of ties between the Albanian diaspora and their homeland after 1944 - 
Albania was one of the very few countries the US had no diplomatic relations 
with between 1946 and 1990 - contributed to the assimilation of ethnic Albanians 
into broader American society and to the progressive decay of community life. 
The Orthodox Church remained a source of collective awareness and preserved 
social ties. Several cultural events continued to be organized, notably annual 
food and music festivals and the celebration of independence day (November 
28). But formerly influent Albanian-American institutions lost impetus as second 
and third generation Albanians were often no longer fluent in Albanian and 
identified strongly with their new American homeland. Even the Albanian 
monthly, Liria (Liberty), the organ of the Free Albania Organization (Shipëria e 
lirë), an association founded in 1941, was compelled to close down in 1996 for 
financial reasons16. This state of affairs also reflected the rather high rate of 
intergenerational social mobility recorded among Albanians in the Boston area. 
A survey conducted by Dennis Nagi in September 1981 with 248 Albanian 
households in the Boston and Greater Boston area showed that among the third 
generation, only 16,9% of the respondents declared they used Albanian language 
at home “half of the time” (83,9% rarely) as opposed to 25,4% (71,4% rarely) 
among the second generation and 69,2% in the first one (26,9% rarely). While 
settlement patterns revealed no particular geographic concentration of Albanians 
in the Greater Boston area, the loosening of community ties was also evidenced 
by a progressive change in marriage patterns: If a large majority of the first and 
second generation respondents chose an Albanian bride (78,6% and 58,2% 
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respectively), among the third generation immigrants, non-Albanian spouses 
were the rule (77,8%). In the meantime, the share of upper middle-class 
Albanians rose from 6,5% among first generation immigrants to 28,3% among 
third generation Albanians, as the number of working class people decreased 
(from 54,8% - mostly fruit peddlers - to 26,1%) (Nagi, 1988, p.70-86).     
 
Finally, the weakening of the original Albanian-American community 
owed to the emergence of deep political cleavages that espoused generational 
fault-lines. Some of the Albanians who had escaped Hoxha’s regime in the mid 
and late forties and emigrated to the United States in the 1950s, had brought 
along strong anti-communist feelings. This new generation of Albanians was 
eventually to take control of most community organizations and publications. 
Vatra in particular was faced with an identity crisis as its founders (Fan S.Noli in 
the first place) who had originally welcomed Hoxha’s assent to power as a step 
towards the consolidation of a sovereign Albania and were little informed about 
the exact nature of Albanian communism were confronted with the evidence and 
testimonies brought by the newcomers17. With the blessing of the American 
government Vatra was thereafter to embrace a stringent anti-communist 
discourse in the late 1950s. Meanwhile, an Albania Free Committee (Komiteti 
Shipëria e lirë) was created by the US State department as part of its containment 
strategy during the Cold War. Until the end of the 1950s, the organization hoped 
to topple the communist regime in Albania. Several Albanians received military 
training with the support of the US and were parachuted in northern Albania. 
Once it became obvious that E.Hoxha was in full control of his country, the 
organization shifted to providing information about the communist regime in 
Albania, and later about the situation in Kosovo (Nazi, 2000, p.133). Their 
offsprings, though, who reached adulthood in the 1970s were less interested in 
home politics and more in America-related social and professional issues. Under 
their aegis, Vatra retreated into cultural affairs, while progressively loosing in 
influence. 
 
Meanwhile, the center of gravity of the community moved slowly away 
from Boston towards New York, and, to a lesser degree, Detroit and Chicago18. In 
the US metropole, Albanians are to be found mostly in the Bronx – where their 
number was estimated between 26,000 and 80,000 in 199919-, in Queens and 
                                                           
17
 In December 1949, Fan Noli himself sent a telegramme to British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, 
asking for an international recognition of the “provisional democratic government of Albania”. For further 
details, see Fan Noli (ed.), Fiftieh Anniversary Book of the Albanian Orthodox Church in America, 1908-
1958, Boston, 1960.    
18
 According to Boston Family genealogy resource website, there were in 1999 approximately 35,000 
Albanians in Greater Boston, including 1,000 Kosovar Albanians.  
See: http://www.bostonfamilyhistory.com/alb_1950.html 
19
 The low-end figures are quoted in Flynn, Kevin, “Empty Seat Hinders Talks to keep peace in Bronx”, 
New York Times, June 26, 1999. K. Flynn has interviewed Robert DeSena, the head of the Council for 
Unity – an organization specialized in soothing and arbitraging between community gangs in high schools -  
but does not explicitly tell where the data comes from. An estimated 100 (out of 4,000 students) were 
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Brooklyn as well as in some neighborhoods in Long Island, Yonkers and 
Waterbury. Those who have undergone rapid social mobility usually move out 
from these peripheral areas to find housing in Manhattan, notably around 5th and 
Park Avenues or in affluent areas North of New York City. The majority of the 
community, there, came from Kosovo and Montenegro after World War II. At 
that time, they settled mostly in the Northen and North-East part of the Bronx as 
well as in the Pelham Parkway and Belmont area. In the latter, the concentration 
of Albanians from Albania is the highest. The area used to be occupied by Italian 
and Irish immigrants who progressively moved out to more affluent 
neighborhoods. In part, because they speak Italian, a lot of Albanians from 
Albania started out in the US working for Italian bosses in restaurants and hotels. 
From a cultural standpoint, they also felt relatively close and got along well. The 
slow change in the “ethnic” paysage of the area has been very aptly described by 
Anthony LaRuffa in Monte Carmelo. An Italian-American Community in the Bronx20. 
Based on an anthropological investigation into the demographic and social 
dynamics of the Belmont area – 100 square blocks with an approximate 30,000 
Italians in the 1960s whose forfathers had come to the US at the beginning of the 
century, often to work as shoemakers, barbers, operatives, fruit venders, etc. -, 
the author has documented the transformation of the area into a multiethnic 
neighborhood with the progressive departure of Italian immigrants and their 
replacement with Puerto-Ricans, African-Americans and “Albanians and 
Yugoslavians”: The “Yugoslavians and the Albanians”, he writes, “had little 
difficulty integrating into the Italian-American dominated neighborhood. Many 
of the Albanians speak Italians and both groups are viewed as White and 
consequently are more like one’s parenti or paesani. Blacks and Puerto Ricans 
have emerged as the threatening stranieri for the Monte Carmelesi. According the 
census date from 1980, at that time, Italians represented only 32% of the 
population of the community (7,420), Puerto Ricans and African-Americans 50% 
and of the approximately 1,600 remaining residents, the majority were Albanians 
and Yugoslavians”21. In time, some of these former Albanian employees have 
become their own boss. Interestingly enough the Council of Belmont 
Organizations, which used to be headed by a member of the Italian community 
at the time when LaRuffa wrote his book and which was responsible for “politcal 
patronage” guaranteeing loyalty to the Democratic party, is now headed by an 
Albanian, Rrustem Celaj22. In fact, today most of the Albanian community 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attending the Herbert Lehman High School in 1999, and 250 (out of 3,400) Christopher Columbus High 
School.  The upper-end data has been often referred to by US media in their coverage of the Kosovo crisis 
in 1999.  
20
 See LaRuffa, Anthony, Monte Carmelo. An Italian-American Community in the Bronx, New York: 
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1988.  The author changed the name of the district from “Belmont” 
to “Monte Carmelo” to preserve the anonymity of his interviewees.  
21
 See LaRuffa, Anthony, Monte Carmelo. An Italian-American Community in the Bronx, op. cit., p.20. 
22
 See LaRuffa, Anthony, Monte Carmelo. An Italian-American Community in the Bronx, op. cit., p.25. The 
Council of Belmont Organization (Këshilli i Organizatave të Belmontit), is located on 2411 Arthur Avenue, 
Bronx, NY.   
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institutions in New York are located in that same Belmont area, especially on 
Arthur Avenue. This holds true for instance for the Illyria newspaper, the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Albanian media group, Bota Sot, etc. In 
addition, one can find there a variety of small businesses, restaurants, grocery 
shops, travel agencies, hardware shops and accountancy firms that bear witness 
to the lively economic activity of the Albanian community there.  
 
 
III – Albanian-American Political Lobbying before 1999: Putting Kosovo on the 
US agenda  
 
Well before the crisis in Kosovo, the Albanian American community in the 
United States had created several organizations whose goals ranged from the 
preservation of cultural heritage and communal solidarities to providing support 
for newcomers. Yet it lacked in overarching structures that might propose a 
common definition of identity and set up widely defined goals. Part of the reason 
for this absence of unified movement stems from the vary internal diversity of 
the Albanian American community. Lack of unity in the emigration mirrored the 
lack of unity among Albanians themselves as a result of a complex and belated 
process of national consolidation. Albanians from Albania proper, Montenegro, 
Kosovo or Macedonia had experienced divergent patterns of identity building. 
They were also divided along religious as well as social lines. Even though, 
abroad, these differences became less salient, some stratified affinities remained. 
Once in the US, the stress was led on inward-oriented activities and on a 
reproduction of the settlement patterns common in the region where the 
immigrants originated. One more impediment to common action stemmed from 
generational cleavages: Those who made it in the new land at the beginning of 
the Century were eager to become integrated. After one or two generations, they 
lost the usage of the language and moved onwards. As Van Christo, the founder 
of the Frosina Foundation in Boston, emphasized, these old generations regarded 
the new waves of settlers in the 1990s with suspicion23. 
 
 Despite the very scattered nature of Albanian community mobilization, 
several stages in organization-building can be identified that closely follow the 
patterns of Albanian immigration to the US. They correspond to various 
preferential locations as well as to changing dominant issues. Basically three 
major phases can be identified when depicting community structures among the 
Albanians: the turn of the century; the period after WWII, and the 1980s-1990s. 
Decisive actors include the Churches, cultural organizations as well as 
representations from the home political parties. Their activities, it is worth 
                                                           
23
 See Bajrami, Vehbi, “An Activist’s Motto: Go for the Goodness”, Illyria, August 22-24, 1998. The new 
foundation was specifically designed to strengthen communal ties and to foster a better integration of new 
settlers in the Boston area.  
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recalling, have been more or less politicized depending on the situation in the 
Balkans and on the broader international environment.  
 
Until the 1970s, attempts at uniting or representing the entire Albanian 
community came from Albania-born Albanians because they were a majority 
and had more historical roots in the US as an émigré community. But later the 
balance started to change as Kosovars arrived from Yuugoslavia, were not yet 
assimilated in American society (while the descendants of the older Albanian 
immigration were starting to be) and took over the leadership. The war in 
Kosovo has only reinforced this long-term trend. The motive behind the exodus 
from Kosovo were often more political than economic. Consequently the new 
immigrants were more prone to be politically active once in the United States. By 
contrast, the Albanians who left Albania in 1944-1945 knew they would not be 
able to go back since the border was closed. They had to reconcile themselves 
with the idea of staying in American undefinitely. The situation of the Kosovars 
in the US was significantly different. They were able to send money to their 
family and relatives, to exhange mail and to remain in touch with evolutions in 
their home country. They preserved a much stronger sense of identification with 
their original state. Perceptions of self also differed: Kosovo was seen as under 
foreign occupation, while Albanians from Albania came from a country that was 
“oppressed” by their own co-nationals. Liberation could not come from the 
withdrawal of a foreign dominion, but depended on settling internal conflicts of 
ideology. Theirs were two sets of radically diverging issues.  
 
Efforts to influence media coverage of the events in Albania and Kosovo 
as well as bringing attention of the US decision-makers started early in the 
1950s…under  US sponsorship. At that time, a major impulse was provided by 
the US State department. Its major tool was the Albania Free Committee that soon 
overpowered the older Vatra organization. Yet step by step concern shifted from 
communist issues to the situation in Kosovo, especially after Belgrade engaged in 
forceful repression of the 1981 student movement. At that time, the first Albanian 
demonstrations were organized in Washington D.C. as well as in cities with 
significant immigrant presence. Contacts were also established with 
Congressmen and U.S. State department officials. While still inexperienced in 
lobbying practices, several new Albanian-American organizations endeavored to 
put Kosovo issues on the government’s agenda. In 1986, they succeeded, thanks 
to the support of Congressman Broomfield (a Democrat from Michigan), in 
convincing the State Department to threaten cancelling most-favored-nation 
status for Yugoslavia in case Pjeter Ivezaj, an Albanian-American from Detroit 
who had participated in the 1981 Washington anti-Yugoslav demonstrations, did 
not get released from the Yugoslav prison he had been sent to upon returning 
home for a visit (Nazi, 2000, p.134).      
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It is not until January 1989, though, that major inroads were made in the 
field of Albanian-American advocacy when former Republican congressman Joe 
DioGuardi set up the Albanian American Civic League (AACL, Liga Qytetare 
Shqiptaro-Amerikane) in New York. An American of Arberesh descent24, 
J.DioGuardi had started raising the question of Miloševi• in Kosovo as early as 
1986. In June of that year, he had tried – to no avail – to bring a resolution in 
Congress that condemned Yugoslavia for violation of human rights of 
Albanians25. Parallel initiatives were undertaken by senators Robert Dole and 
Paul Simon26. A year later, he had managed to rally fifty-five congressmen in 
support of a similar resolution27. Following this diffusion of a “Memorandum on 
the Persecution of the Albanian Population in Yugoslavia” by the Albanian Youth 
of Kosovo in the Free World, an New York-based Albanian-American organization 
set up by Arif Malcici in 1977, seven US Congressmen accompanied DioGuardi 
on a visit to Kosovo in August 1990 - during which they were introduced to 
Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovo Democratic League (LDK, Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës). In their later assessment of the situation in the 
Yugoslav province, some were to remain deeply influenced by this first-hand 
experience with Serb repressive policies – notably, Sen. Don Nickles (R-Oklah.), 
who was to co-sponsor the Nickles-Bentley Amendment passed in October 1990 
that required the US government to suspend economic aid to Yugoslavia until 
the Secretary of State certified that the Yugoslav government was respecting its 
obligations under the Helsinki Accords and ceasing human rights abuses in 
Kosovo28.  
                                                           
24
 Born in the Bronx in 1940, Joe DioGuardi was a public accountant before he was elected to the US 
House of Representatives in November 1984 on the side of the Republicans. He did not get reelected to a 
second mandate.  
25
 The exact reference of the resolution is: 99Th Congress, 2d Session, H. CON. RES. 358, “Condemning the 
repression of ethnic Albanians by the Government of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia”.The 
text of the resolution can be found on the AACL’s website. 
 See: http://aacl.com/Congressional/Congressional_dir/Congressional_2.htm 
26
 Senator Robert Dole submitted Sen. CON. RESO 150 to the 99Th Congress, 2nd session “Expressing 
concern over the condition of ethnic Albanians living in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” on 
June 18, 1986. It was concurrent with J. DioGuardi’s resolution 99Th Congress, 2d Session, H. CON. RES. 
358 submitted in the House. See: http://aacl.com/Congressional/Congressional_dir/Congressional_6.htm 
27
 The resolution is referred to as H. CON RES. 162, l00Th Congress, 1st Session, “Expressing concern 
over the conditions of ethnic Albanians living in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. It was 
introduced in the House of Representatives on July 15, 1987. The text of the resolution can be found on the 
AACL’s website. See: http://aacl.com/Congressional/Congressional_dir/Congressional_12.htm 
28
 Amendment by Rep. Helen Delich Bentley – a Serbian American who was active in opposing most of the 
Congress resolutions that called attention to human rights abuses in Kosovo and were perceived as “pro-
Albanian”- led to a conservative understanding of the Nickles text. It was restricted to fiscal year 1991 and 
concerned only $ 5 million of direct assistance.  Supposed to come into effect six months after it was voted 
(May 5, 1991), the Nickles-Bentley Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was never implemented – 
following Secretary of State  James Baker’s certification in Congress. Nonetheless, this piece of legislature 
is perceived by some observers, chief among them former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren 
Zimmerman, as bearing testimony to the the detrimental role played by Congress in the US management of 
the Yugoslav crisis.  This “foolish congressional action”, W. Zimmerman wrote, hit “the clarity and 
consistency of US policy” at a time when the dominant line was in favor of preserving Yugoslav unity.  For 
further details, see Zimmerman, Warren, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996”, In: Azrael, Jeremy R. and Emil A. 
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Launched shortly after DioGuardi failed to be re-elected in Congress, the 
AACL was thus created as a tool for influencing US response to developments in 
Kosovo. Some of the well-off Kosovar émigrés supported the initiative, including 
financially. Others joined his organization like Sami Repishti, an Albanian from 
Shkodër and a renowned lawyer. The AACL’s priority went to publicizing the 
Kosovo issue. For that purpose, in 1990, the Civic League created the Albanian 
American Public Affairs Committee (AAPAC) to support congressmen who 
accepted to champion Albanian-related resolutions as well as an Albanian-
American Foundation. Fund-raising was a major part of the job, collecting and 
spreading information another. Under the Clinton administration, these efforts 
were made easier by the presence in Congress of several known supporters of 
the Albanian cause, among whom Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.), 
Representative and Chairman of the House International Relations Committee 
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Senator and chair of both the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee, Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Sen. Alfonse d’Amato, Rep. Tom Lantos 
and Representative and co-chair of the Albanian Issues Caucus Eliot Engel29 (D-
NY) – some of whom were J. DioGuardi’s personal friends.  
 
Tensions, however, arose between the AACL’s leader and the community 
shortly after the regime change in Albania. Reasons behind these disagreements 
were fourfold. First, as early as 1991 Joseph DioGuardi – with the help of his 
wife, Shirley A. Cloyes -, went to Albania with the hope that he might act as an 
intermediate between the United States and the Balkan state coming out of 
several decades of autarky. Several Kosovar supporters of the advocacy 
organization disapproved of what they saw as an overstrech30. Second, they also 
started worrying that J. DioGuardi might be trying to monopolize ties with the 
Albanian world. Assessments about the role of S. Berisha in Albania also 
differed. In 1994 information about the authoritarian tendencies of the Albanian 
leader reached the United States. Those in the diaspora who had hoped for a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Payin (eds.), “US. And Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of force”, Rand, CF-129-CRES, 
Santa Monica, California, 1996.   
29Rep. Eliot Engel has been one of the most active congressmen in support of the Albanian “cause”. A 
Democrat, he is a representative of the Bronx. His interest in Albanian issues stemmed from his awareness 
of the existence of a strong Albanian presence in the Bronx. Engel was among the first members of 
Congress that the Albanians of the Bronx community started to approach about the Kosovar question 
around 1989. Cooperation with the A.A.C.L. but also with NAAC and the LDK representation in the US 
have been regular since that time. Whenever Engel stood up for reelection, Albanian-American community 
organizations did fund-raising for him. Beside Rep. Eliot Engel, Rep. Benjamin Gilman and Rep. Tom 
Lantos were members of the Albanian Issues Caucus in the 106th Congress.  The full list of the 106th 
Congress Albanian Issues Caucus members may be found at: 
http://www.frosina.org/advisories/Alb_caucus.shtml 
30In 1991, when Albanians crossed to the foreign embassies and large demonstrations were organized in 
Tirana, this situation  in Kosovo was very tense. In Albania, rumors strated to spread according to which 
the Albanian secret police (sigurimi) was working with the Serb special services to allow Albanians to get 
into foreign embassies so as to divert attention from the Kosovo issue.  
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close partnership with Berisha became highly desillusioned and started 
advocating a shift in priorities. J. DioGuardi did not follow suit. In addition, 
opinions diverged with regard to the strategy to be applied in Kosovo. 
DioGuardi was an early sceptic of the chances for peaceful resistance to succeed. 
As he distanced himself from I.Rugova, dissatisfaction grew in some segments of 
the Kosovo-originated diaspora where the LDK enjoyed a high level of prestige. 
Finally, rumors have it in the Albanian-American New York community that 
disagreements over the usage of funds contributed an equal share to internal 
infighting. Well aware of the need to be present in Congress, J. DioGuardi had 
advocated raising funds for the Congressmen who vowed to put the Kosovo 
issues on the agenda. Yet some members of the diaspora doubted the efficiency 
of this procedure.  
 
The split finally occurred in 1995, with Sami Repishti leaving the 
organization to initiate a rival structure, the National Albanian American Council 
(NAAC, Këshillin Kombëtar Shqiptaro-Amerikan), alongside people like Harry 
Bajkraktari, Illyria’s owner. NAAC was officially set up on October 1, 1996 as a 
non-partisan organization that purports to link the Albanian-American 
community to the US government and the Albanians in the Balkans31. Based in 
Washington32, NAAC ambitioned to become the official Albanian-American 
lobby and to differentiate itself from AACL in terms both of focus and of tone. 
The AACL started as a Kosovo-based structure. By contrast, NAAC appeared 
more concerned with developments in other Albanian-inhabited lands, notably 
Albania and Montenegro, as well as with Western assistance and business-
related issues. The background of its leading figures are not foreign to this 
hierarchy of priorities. As mentioned ealier Sami Repishti, NAAC’s first 
president, is from Skodër; Ilir Zherka, who was executive director between 
November 16, 1998 and June 2000, comes from Krušev, an Albanian town in 
Montenegro33; Ekrem Bardha, one of the co-founders of NAAC, left Albania in 
                                                           
31
 NAAC’s goals were officially formulated in the following way on the 1998 website of the organization – 
taht has, since then, been entirely redesigned -: “NAAC is an independent, nonprofit community 
association dedicated to representing the interests and concerns of the Albanian-Americans, and to 
fostering a better understanding of Albanian issues in the United States. NAAC is committed to 
strengthening the friendship between the people of the United States and the Albanian people living in the 
Republics of Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. NAAC seeks to persuade the 
White House, Congress, foreign policy experts, the media, and the American people that the United States 
can and should exert leadership in helping to address the plight of Albanians, and thereby securing peace 
and stability in the Balkans. In particular, NAAC seeks: political, economic and military support for the 
Republic of Albania; support for the self determination of the people of Kosova; full participation and 
representation of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia; as well as full minority rights wherever the Albanians 
are not a majority. NAAC is also dedicated to involving Albanian-Americans in the political process here at 
home”. See: http://www.alb-net.com/about.htm  
32
 In 2001, NAAC opened two new chapters, one in Massachussets – July 24, 2001 - and one in Michigan – 
October 4, 2001 - thus reaching out both to the old Albanian immigration and to a region that has witnessed 
continued growth of its Albanian community over the past years.   
33A lawyer residing in New York, Ilir Zherka immigrated to the United States in 1968 and settled in the 
Bronx. He graduated from Cornell University and the University of Virginia. In 1996, I.Zherka joined the 
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the 1950s34. While starting to develop its network, NAAC also decided to turn not 
only to wealthy Albanian-Americans, but to those that were educated and had 
made it high on the US professional and social scale. Lawyers, bankers and 
successful businessmen were invited to join. 
 
Beside differences in social targetting, AACL and NAAC offered 
divergent understanding of the proper solution to Albanian issues. J.DioGuardi 
often spoke of the seven millions Albanians unfairly divided by history with a 
highly emotional wording35. Independence for Kosovo was an explicit goal. 
While refraining from advocating a “Greater Albania”, the League did not shy 
away from nationalistic slogans. From the very onset, NAAC was more discreet 
and moderate. Part of its founding – besides donations from the Albanian 
diaspora -  came from US governmental agencies. Several US officials were also 
invited to sit on the board of the organization from 2000 onwards, among whom 
Congressmen Eliot Engel and Sue Kelly, Ambassador William Ryerson and 
Ambassador William Walker. Understandibly, the Albanian-American 
organization claimed to pursue Albanian interests, but only within a framework 
acceptable to US officials. The stress was laid on lobbying for a democratic 
Albania, for the development of Albanian-inhabited areas in the Balkans as well 
as for extended cooperation with the region. Typically, NAAC organized 
conferences for business people interested in investing in Albania or in South-
East Europe at large.  
 
At an early stage, gaining influence over AACL and NAAC became a 
major stake for Albanian parties – both from Kosovo and Albania. One of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Clinton-Gore re-election campaign and was responsible for organizing Americans of European and South 
Mediterranean descent and served as the spokesperson for the President during rallies, and for ethnic radio, 
television, and newspaper interviews. He started out in politics as congressional staffer for Congressman 
George Miller (D-CA) between 1994 and 1997. On that year, he was appointed to the Department of Labor 
by President Clinton and served as Senior Legislative Officer until 1998. He has been one of the most 
frequent speakers in Albanian-American rallies in Washington.  
34
 In June 2000, Richard Lukaj replaced Ilir Zherka as chairman of NAAC. A senior managing director of 
Bear Stearns and graduate from New York University Business School, R. Lukaj is son to an immigrant 
from Ulqin, Montenegro. He was born in 1969 in a refugee camp outside Napoli (Italy). Together with his 
family, he immigrated to the United States in 1970, and grew up in Brooklyn, New York. Within the 
Albanian-American community, he is often perceived as a role model for having made a successful career 
in finances and achieved recognition by his peers (R. Lukaj made the cover of the November 1999 issue of 
Investment Dealer’s Digest). In 2000, while he was still just a member of the Board of Trustees of NAAC, 
he donated $ 100,000 to the organization. For a lengthy interview with 32-year-old Richard Lukaj, see: 
http://www.alb-net.com/pipermail/alb-club/Week-of-Mon-20000320/003284.html.    
35
 The presentation of the scope and goals of the AACL on its web-site is illustrative: “The purpose of the 
Civic League is to further the human rights and the national cause of the divided nation of more than seven 
million Albanians living side by side in the Balkans in Albania, Kosova, western Macedonia, southeastern 
Montenegro, Presheve, Medvegje, Bujanovc (southern Serbia), and Chameria (northern Greece). By 
bringing the political perspectives of 400.000 Albanian Americans to the US Government, the civic League 
works to end the repression and oppression of Albanians living under hostile Slavic Communist regimes in 
the Balkans and to preserve the culture, identity and human rights of Albanians throughout the world”. See: 
http://aacl.com/about2.shtml2.htm   
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major contenders was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which had 
opened a representation in the United States as early as March 3, 1990. Its 
chairman for the New York, New Jersey and Connecticut branches was Rrustem 
Ibraj, a Kosovar Albanian who had studied at Pristina university before coming 
to the US at the end of the 1980s. From 1990 to 1998, Rrustem Ibraj was to be 
responsible for collecting funds for the LDK and for trying to promote Albanian 
issues in the media and among the political elite36. A large majority of the 
community members remained actually faithful to their commitments and 
regularly gave 3% of the revenues to the LDK- at least until 1998 and the 
strengthening of the UCK in the diaspora. While originally positive, relations 
between Joe DioGuardi and the LDK strained when it became obvious that both 
were competing for the same pool of donators, and that the US politician 
adopted stands that did not espouse the LDK’s closely enough. NAAC was more 
enduringly favorable to the Democratic League. Its rallying to the UCK was to 
come only at the time of the war in Kosovo –when peaceful resistance was no 
longer an option.  
 
Which advocacy organization was most efficient before 1999 is difficult to 
determine. In various ways, they all contributed to pushing the needs of the 
Kosovo-based resistance in the public eye. At the beginning, unlike J. 
DioGuardi’s Civic League, the LDK enjoyed little insider access in Washington 
and it turned to PR firms. In so doing the Kosovo representatives were not 
following a very unique path. Since the end of the Cold War, the PR and 
lobbying industry has been dramatically growing in the United States. Its major 
clients come from countries and regions that did not formerly have official 
relations with the US and need visibility. In 1995, four lobbyists were registered 
with the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) filings under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA) as promoting Kosovo’s interests37. These were Ruder 
Finn, Inc.38 – 235,292.58 $ for a 12 month period ending on November 30, 1995 -  
Arnold and Porter – 2,616.00 $ for a six month period ending on June 4, 1995 ; 
                                                           
36
 He was later replaced with Ramazan Bekteshi as a coordinator of the LDK for North America. Marjan 
Cubi is now secretary of the LDK chapter in New York and Naim Dedushaj, leader of the political bureau 
of the LDK. Both have been involved with the LDK in the United States since its foundation.  
37
 The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was adopted in 1938 by the US Congress in “response to 
the large number of German propaganda agents in the pre-WWII U.S” (quoted as in FARA Q & A). It 
compels companies that are hired to promote a given foreign country’s or corporation’s interests to register 
with the Department of Justice and to provide information about their activities, income and expenditures.  
The full text of the act is available on the Internet at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/FaraIndx.htm 
38
 Ruder Finn is reputed for being one of the first consultancy firms that started working for Balkan 
governements in the 1990s. It initially represented the governments of Croatia and Bosnia, and then the 
Kosovo parallel government of Ibrahim Rugova between 1992 and 1997. James W. Harff, who headed 
Ruder Finn’s Global Public Affairs division until he joinde Global Communicators in 1997, described their 
work in the following terms: “People had no idea where Kosovo was, what the issues were, who the 
personalities were, or what US policy interest were in the region. Our challenge was to bring them into 
contact with people who needed to have an understading and a desire to understand. Part of the decision-
making is having information from a diversity of sources”. Quoted in Geman, Ben, “Diplomacy for Hire”,  
Boston Phoenix, June 1, 1999. 
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Shafiq Nuri for American Trade & Investments – amount unknown – and 
Bardhyl Tirana, an Albanian who came to the US shortly after the advent of 
commnunism in Albania and later became a financial analyst and a PR person39  – 
868.34 $ for a 12 month period ending October 31, 1995 -. Asked to prop up 
interest in the human rights situation in Kosovo, the firms coordinated meetings 
with congressional staffers, US officials and members of Congress, American 
media and Washington think tanks.  
 
Although there is little doubt that public-relations operations increased 
awareness of Kosovo issues among the US public and the elite, their influence 
needs to be put into perspective. By comparison with the PR offensives 
simultanously deployed by neighbouring states, such as Croatia, the amounts of 
money spent by the Albanians on official lobbying were rather limited. In 1995 
alone, 713,150.16 $ were officially devoted by Zagreb to US consultancy 
agencies40. Yet, over the course of the decade, members of the Albanian-
American community were to rely on PR firms more and more. Several other 
public-relations agencies were thus hired in 199941 – chief among them 
Washington International Group (WIG), a PR company headed by former Balkans 
Desk officer for the US State Department Marshall Freeman Harris which 
advised the Albanian negociating team during the Rambouillet talks in 199942 -, 
Patton Boggs, L.L.P – a participant in the organization of Hashim Thaçi’s trip to 
the United States - and Global Communicators (GC)43.      
 
The balance sheet of the 1990s until the emergence of a guerilla insurgency 
in Kosovo can be summarized as follows: Since the 1970s the Albanian-American 
community has been steadily growing. While a majority of the settlers were blue-
colar workers or ran small businesses, some exiles who fled Kosovo after Serbian 
                                                           
39
 Bardhyl Tirana also sits on the Honorary Board of NAAC.  
40
 The data is public and was available on the web site of FARA at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/indextxt.html in June 1999. Complementary information may be 
downloaded from the O’Dwyer Washington Report, a bi-weekly based on the United States Senate Foreign 
Agent Registration Act monthly files at http://www.odwyerpr.com/washington_report/  
41
 It might be interesting to note that the White House also resorted to the services of PR firms in its 
management of the Kosovo-campaign. At the end of May 1999, Leslie Dach, vice-chair of PR Edelman 
Worldwide and the head of its Washington Office was asked to work with White House chief of Staff John 
Podesta on dealing with NATO air campaign and atrocities in Kosovo. See “Dach Gets Special Kosovo 
Assignment”, O’Dwyer’s Washington Report, May 19, 1999. 
42
 According to FARA bi-annual report for the first half of 1999, WIG received $151,720.00 for a period of 
six month ending on January 31, 1999 and “arranged a trip by the Prime Minister of Kosova to the United 
States to meet with U.S. Congressmen and participate in a number of media interviews. The registrant also 
was interviewed by the media on behalf of the foreign principal and acted as a consultant during the 
Rambouillet Peace talks held in Paris in February, 1999”. 
 See: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/fara1st99/COUNTRY/KOSOVA.HTM 
43
 Let us note that the name of Global Communicators does not appear in FARA’s 1999 and 2000 reports. 
Yet, on the website of  GC the “Republic of kosova” is mentioned as one of the clients of the firm. GC was 
hired to “publiciz[e] drive for independence from the former Yugoslavia”.  
See: http://www.globalcommunicators.com/cpp.html. No date is being provided, though.  
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control over the province increased started to get mobilized and to attempt, from 
the United States, to influence local developments back home. During the decade 
that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia, these people engaged in a variety of 
activities that ranged from the creation of Albanian-American media to political 
lobbying. Over the course of the decade, some experience-capital was to be 
garnered in Washington, notably through the AACL, the LDK and the NAAC. 
Yet, in all respects, the 1998-1999 crisis was to represent a major test for 
Albanian-Americans. A test of unity, first, since the conflict forced a 
reconsideration of previous internal differenciation among the various waves of 
immigrants. A test of commitment, second, as humanitarian and aid initiative 
flourished that built on pre-existing communal and religious networks as well as 
on ad hoc mobilization. And, finally, a test of influence. The growing strength of 
the UCK in the diaspora represented a major challenge, as infighting with LDK 
representatives was feared by some. Once some degree of cohesion was 
achieved, shaping US policies in favor of military intervention and in order to 
legitimize the quest for Kosovo independence confronted the Albanian-
American community with the need to make up for its relative weakness in 
terms of sheer numbers by maximizing the efficiency of its connections in 
Congress as well as in the Clinton administration44. More than ever, media 
visibility was a decisive springboard. In this respect, the influx of about 15,000 
refugees from Kosovo after the start of the NATO-led bombings was 
undoubtedly helpful. The ability of the Albanian diaspora to come together and 
shape the Clinton foreign policy agenda in the Balkans, however, should not be 
reified – as will be seen further down.  
 
 
IV – Coming to politics: The effects of the Kosovo war on the Albanian-
Amercian community  
 
When considering the impact of the UCK-led uprising and the NATO 
bombings of Spring 1999 on the Albanian-Americans, several levels need to be 
kept in mind – identity dynamics, communal mobilization and Albanian-
American politics. These various dimensions will be reviewed in turn, as one 
moves from attempting to grasp the reactions of the community to the creation of 
the UCK and the armed struggle in Kosovo, to envisioning humanitarian 
mobilization in the United States in the Spring of 1999 and finally to the 
nurturing of an “Albanian lobby”.  
 
 
1.Rallying to the UCK: Beyond divisions, Together we stand  
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 By comparison, let us recall that the Croatian diaspora in the United States and Canada is approximated 
between one and 2,5 million strong. Quoted in duric, Ivana, “The Croatian Diaspora in North America: 
Identity, Ethnic solidarity, and the Formation of a “Transnational National Community”, op. cit., p.1   
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The war in Kosovo precipitated a restructuring of the Albanian American 
community and a generational change in community leadership. The impact was 
felt not only among average Albanian Americans, but also in the organizational 
structures of the community. Before 1925, the dominant theme had been the 
national question, that is Albania’s independence. The period after 1945 had 
revolved around the communist/anti-communist ideological motive. 
Meanwhile, the question of the unification of the entire Albanian nation under 
the same roof had been relegated into the background. With the downfall of the 
Hoxha regime, the anti-communist cause faded away and left part of the old 
notables of the community without an overarching theme for continuing to 
mobilize their supporters. Some of them find themselves at a loss to taking the 
new turn. Others followed the new trend and progressively shifted emphasis 
from strictly Albanian issues to the Kosovo theme. All in all, however, the idea of 
the broader unification of the nation did not appeal to a majority of the 
community. Bridging the gap between Albanians from Albania proper and from 
the new Kosovar emigration would have requested a shared understanding of 
national identity that was hard to come by. Beyond the surface discourse on 
commonalities and Albanian-ness, feelings of solidarity remained very parochial. 
 
The shift from a peaceful to an armed form of resistance to Miloševi•’s 
regime in Kosovo, however, encouraged a form of reconnection between the 
various Albanian groups and a reactivation of the willingness to cooperate across 
organizations. News of Serb repression contributed to blurr the boundary 
between the Albanian and the Kosovar immigration. In fact, not all those who 
enrolled with the UCK structures in the US came from Kosovo. When a 
Homeland Calling (Vendlindja thërret) office opened in New York, its leader - 
Shefki Maxhuni45 - was a first generation Kosovar immigrant, but the secretary 
was born in Tirana. In the same way, at least two of the eight members of the 
Provisional Government of Kosova’s office in New York were Albanians. The 
Government’s spokesperson, Shinasi Rama, a Ph. Candidate at Columbia 
University, had previously made a name for himself as one of the leaders of the 
1990 student demonstrations in Tirana. Part of his family was based in Skodër; 
more distant relatives lived in Kosovo.    
 
Still, the move away from the LDK to the UCK did not occur overnight, 
nor was it easy. The choices made by the major Albanian-American 
organizations need to be understood against the background of political alliances 
on the Albanian scene. Until the beginning of 1999, Vatra, for instance, held the 
UCK in disbelief. Out of anti-communist solidarity, the Boston organization 
followed the line adopted by Albanian president Sali Berisha who was then 
favorable to Ibrahim Rugova. As Berisha changed his position and let UCK 
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 The UCK fund was located in the Bronx – on Arthur Avenue -. In charge of UCK funding, S. Maxhuni 
also contributed to financing the office of the Provisional Goverment of Kosova that was created in New 
York after the failure of the Rambouillet negociations in March 1999. 
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members establish training camps in northern Albania, and also for the sake of 
unity in the Albanian American community, Vatra later softened its tone. 
Commitment to the guerilla did not come naturally to NAAC either. Some of its 
members, who kept in close relations with Vatra, knew of the UCK’s relations to 
the marxist-leninist People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK, Levizja Popullore e 
Kosovës) based in Switzerland. Information on cooperation between Albania’s 
Socialist party and the Kosovar rebels, confirmed by Western media reports, did 
not go unnoticed either among the Albanian-American community. All the 
strongly anti-communist groups remained suspicious of the Liberation Army – 
until the US intervention in March 1999.  
 
Among the Albanian-American immigrants in the New York area, the 
UCK started gaining influence after a Serb police raid that left over 25 people 
dead in the Drenica region in February 1998. Some efforts at raising money had 
started earlier, notably thanks to Florin Krasniqi, a Kosovar and former geometry 
teacher based in Brooklyn, NY since 1989 whose cousin, Adrian, was killed by 
the Serb police in October 199746. But March 1998 was the moment when many of 
the former members of the LDK as well as ordinary Albanians-Americans started 
sending volunteer donations to the new-found US chapter of the Homeland 
Calling47. It is approximately around that time that Rrustem Ibraj, the LDK 
representative in New York and New England, decided to shift sides and rallied 
the UCK. Like others, he was disappointed with what had been achieved in a 
decade of peaceful opposition to the Serb authorities, and became convinced that 
there was no alternative to military confrontation. Also, he thought that in face of 
a situation of emergency the community had to show unity of purpose. In his 
view, LDK and UCK were bound to cooperate48. After eight years of raising 
funds for the LDK, R. Ibraj enjoyed an extensive network of contacts in the 
diaspora and was instrumental in helping the new UCK leaders to locate 
potential donators49. His decision was strongly reproved by some LDK activists 
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 Florin Krasniqi’s story has been often told by the US media. See, among others, “Albanian-Americans 
Help fund the KLA”, AFP, February 20, 1999; Sullivan, Stacy, “From Brooklyn to kosovo, with Love and 
AK-47’s”, The New York Times, November 22, 1998 and Sullivan, Stacy, “Albanian Americans Funding 
Rebels’ Cause”, Washington Post, May 26, 1998. On Albanian-American fund-raising, see also Ruppe, 
David, “Albanian-Americans Fund the Kosova Guerrillas”, ABCNEWS.com, April 30, 1999. 
47One of  the fund’s bank account was located at People’s Bank in Stamford, CT 06902-6014 (US account 
number: 0617008215; 328 Shippan Ave.). After the war ended, the fund changed its name and became the 
Fund for Kosovo (Fundi e Kosovës). 
48
 Interview with Rrustem Ibraj, New York, April 18, 2001. 
49In the United States, raising money for a foreign rebel armed group is not illegal so long as the group is 
not listed as a terrorist organization by the State Department. By contrast, smuggling weapons into Kosovo 
was not allowed in 1998 and 1999, since the province, still officially part of Yugoslavia, fell under the UN 
arms embargo against Yugoslavia (resolution 1160, March 31, 1998). “The Security Council”, the 
resolution said, “decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, 
prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their nationals or 
from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, such 
as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and 
shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities there ”. On September 23, 1998, a new UN 
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in New York proper. Yet, by the beginning of 1999, a majority of the community 
had swung towards the guerilla.  
 
Contributions to the UCK ranged from sending money, to arranging 
shipments of humanitarian aid and weapons, and finally to signing up fighters. 
How much money was finally raised is difficult to ascertain. During fund-raising 
events, dinners and cocktail parties in New York – often organized in Albanian-
run restaurants -, no less than $30,000 to 50,000 were usually collected. By May 
1998, US journalist Stacy Sullivan quoted a Krasniqi family member as having 
declared that between $3 to $4 millions had already been raised in the United 
States50. And the digits undoubtedly increased in the Fall of 1998 and following 
the Raçak massacre in January 1999. Uk Lushi, one of the participants in the 
Atlantic Brigade (Batalion Atlantiku), a group of about 200 Albanian-Americans 
who departed from the US to fight in Kosovo, mentions that $3 million -whose 
final destination has been disputed by some sources- were gathered by the 
Albanian diaspora in North America for the brigade51. In fact, much of the money 
was sent home in cash through a variety of channels – most of them not 
centralized by the UCK. Besides, not all the remittances from abroad was 
earmarked for the guerilla, although it seems that part of the humanitarian aid 
was finally used to buy weapons. After rumors started spreading about funds 
being diverted by some unscrupulous UCK leaders in 1999, members of the US-
based diaspora became even more cautious. Some used family-based networks to 
make sure that the dollars did reach their relatives.  
 
 Another source of funding for the Albanian rebel army often mentioned in 
the Western press has to do with organized crime52. Yet, if the role of Albanians 
from Kosovo in drug-dealing and other crime-related activities linked to the so-
called « Balkan route » has been underlined by various official agencies – notably 
in the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) 1996 
Report53 – and if part of these networks started operating in the New York area 
                                                                                                                                                                             
resolution (1199), however, went further. Recalling the obligations of all states to implement resolution 
1160, it also requested “States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant 
international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160”. No 
particular action was taken in the US to prevent fundraising by Homeland Call. For further details, see 
Office of the Spkesman for the Secretary-general, Use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The former Yugoslavia (updated January 2002) at: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/fy.htm  
50See Sullivan, Stacy, “Albanian Americans Funding Rebels’ Cause”, Washington Post, May 26, 1998. 
51For further details, see Lushi, Uk. New York-Prishtine-New York Batalioni Atlantiku. Shënime Lufte dhe 
Paqeje [New York-Pristina-New York. The Atlantic Brigade. Notes on War and Peace], Prishtinë : 
Rilindja, March 2001, p.132-133.  
52
 On the supposed links between crime and UCK, see, among others, Roberto Ruscica, “Albanian Mafia, 
This Is How It Helps The Kosovo Guerrilla Fighters”, Corriere della Sera, October 15, 1998; Michel 
Chossudovsky, “Kosovo Freedom fighters financed by organized Crime”, April 7, 1999 (on the Web at 
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/chossudovsky/#balkans); Boyes, Roger and Eske Wright, 
“The KLA Drugs money linked to the Kosovo Rebels”, The Times (London), March 24, 1999.   
53
 See U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence division, “The Supply of 
Illicit Drugs to the United States”, NNICC Report, Washington 1996. According to the report: “drug 
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long before the Kosovo conflict started54, it is difficult to demonstrate the 
existence of links between Albanian crime in the United States and the UCK. 
Much less to provide data about the funds thus raised. As Tim Judah made it 
plain in a thoughtful article published in the New York Review of Books in August 
1999, « All sorts of charges have been leveled against the KLA. These include 
accusations that they are drug smugglers and, recently, that they have executed 
political opponents and dissenters. Certainly the KLA has taken money from the 
Kosovo Albanian mafia but this does not make the KLA, per se, a drug-
smuggling organization”55.  
  
One ends up being compelled to add up data from UCK fund-raisers and 
Albanian-American community leaders and from Serb-police or pro-Serb 
sources. In both cases, there is a likelihood that figures will be magnified - to 
suggest the strength of ethnic solidarity and sacrifice in the first case, to 
demonize the “all-powerful Albanian lobby”, in the second one. Trying to assess 
the role played by the US and Canada based-diaspora in joining the UCK fighters 
in Kosovo might provide one more opportunity to appreciate the role of the 
Albanian diaspora…as well as the instrumentalization of the media by political 
actors on both sides of the ethnic divide. Much has been said about the 
thousands of representatives from the diaspora that were believed to have 
answered the call to arms to rally the Albanian uprising in Kosovo56. In the US 
context, the initiative behind the creation of what was to be known as the 
Atlantic brigade (Atlantiku batalioni) came from some New-York-based Albanian-
Americans. Among them were Shinasi Rama, the spokesperson of the recently 
set-up Provisional Government of Kosova in the United States, and a former 
                                                                                                                                                                             
trafficking organizations composed of ethnic Albanians from Serbia’s Kosovo Province  were considered to 
be second only to Turkish groups as the predominant heroin smugglers along the Balkan route. (…) There 
is increasing evidence that ethnic criminals from the Balkans are engaged in criminal activities in the 
United States and some of that activity involves theft of licit pharmaceutical products for illicit street 
distribution”.The full report, however, is no longer available online on the website of the DEA. Abstracts 
may be found on Serb websites. See, for instance, the site of the Serb Unity Congress: 
http://www.suc.org/politics/kosovo/html/NNICC-report96.html. Let us note, however, that no reference to 
the Albanian mafia is made in the September 1999 DEA Report on “Drug Trafficking in the United States” 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/99024/99024.html), nor in the September 2001 version of the report 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/01020/index.html).  
54
 One of the early cases evidenced in police records dates back to 1985 when Skender Fici, an Albanian 
who ran the Theresa Worldwide Staten Island travel agency was indicted on federal charges of drug dealing 
and racketeering and received a-eight-year prison sentence after helping the police to dismantle a drug ring 
in New York that imported heroin from Turkey. S. Fici has started shipping drugs in 1979. At that time, the 
share of the “Balkan route” in US heroin supply was estimated between 25% and 40% by the Drug 
Enforcement Agency. For further details, see DeStefano, Anthony, “Giuliani and Kosovo-Albanian Drug 
Mafia in NYC”, Wall Street Journal, September 9, 1985.    
55
 See Judah, Tim, “Kosovo: Peace Now”, The New York Review of Books, August 12, 1999. 
56
 Among others, see “US volunteers join Kosova rebels”, BBC, April 21, 1999 on Internet at: 
http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/042199e.htm#6 (Kosova Crisis Center). “A huge influx of volunteers is 
flooding into Albania to join the Kosova Liberation Army in its fight against Serb forces. Ethnic Albanians 
are leaving their jobs across Europe and the United States to return to their homeland”, it is claimed. Yet no 
accurate data is being provided though.  
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member of the advisory team to the Albanian delegation in Rambouillet, and 
Dino Asanaj, a Kosovar who had made a career in the construction business and 
was the head of the Kosova Office. In selecting potential candidates, the UCK 
supporters were helped by Gani Shehu, a former Yugoslav Army officer and a 
member of the UCK ealier brought to the US to receive treatment after a wound 
in Kosovo. About 400 Albanians gathered on April 12, 1999 outside an Albanian-
run hotel, the Royal Regency Hotel in Yonkers. The NY and US press at large had 
been warned about the event. Several reporters came to interview the young and 
often second-generation teenagers, most of whom had never even visited their 
parents’ home country and spoke only broken-home Albanian, as they got ready 
to depart for training camps in northen Albania57. Few are those who had prior 
military experience either in the US military or in the Yugoslav army.  
 
In practice, though, the number of recruits that actually left for the 
Balkans seems to have been somewhat inferior to the 400 originally announced, 
in part because some of the volunteers had to be turned for medical reasons or 
for lack of proper US legal documents. Journalist Bert Roughton provides a 
conservative estimate of  “approximately 80 Americans, three of whom are 
women” in a May 1999 feature article on the Albanian-Americans trained at a 
camp situated seven miles away from the town of Burrel, north of Albania58. At 
the same date, reporter Jonathan Linday mentions “several hundred” recruits. By 
all accounts, however, in mid-May, the Atlantic Brigade was still receiving 
instruction close to the Albanian-Yugoslav border59. Some local observers 
suspected that the UCK, already plagued by internal divisions and weak-
command, was reluctant to let the US recruits face a certain death in war-torn 
Kosovo. Three weeks later, S.Miloševi• was to bow to the NATO air-campaign. 
Participation in combat in Kosovo was thus rather limited for the soldiers who 
had come all the way from the United States60. And so was the number of 
casualties. Rrustem Ibraj thought in April 2001 that one recruit had died61. A few 
victims were to be later identified62. Six soldiers was said to have been wounded 
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 See, for instance, Dobnik, Vera, “Albanian-Americans Volunteer to Fight”, The Boston Globe, April 12, 
1999; Dobnik, Vera, “Albanian Nationals in the US join fight against Serbs. Outfitted in store-bought 
uniforms; recruits leave to join Kosovo Struggle”, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 12, 1999; Gonzalez, 
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 See Roughton, Bert, “Americans Joining Kosovo Rebels. From urban neighborhood in New York, 
Detroit and Chicago, sympathizeers are being drawn back to fight fo a homeland they never knew”, The 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, May 18, 1999.  
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 Quoted in Landay, Jonathan, “From USA to a KLA boot camp”, The Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 
1999. 
60For further details on the Brigade’s military achievements, see Smith, Jeffrey et Finn, Peter, “Yankee 
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 Interview with Rrustem Ibraj, op. cit.  
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 On March 3, 2002, the bodies of three brothers from Long Island who had fought in the Atlantic Brigade 
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during one of the most notable UCK operations in which the Brigade 
participated – “operation Arrow” started on May 20, that aimed to open a 
corridor around Mount Pashtrik, a remote region on the border of Southwest 
Kosovo, and seize both banks of the Beli Drin (Drini i Bardh)63. In fact, the 
Atlantic Brigade was essentially important as a living proof to the will and the 
solidarity that members of the Albanian diaspora were able to feel despite living 
on the other side of the Ocean. Community mobilization in favor of the refugees 
from Kosovo offered one more illustration of this strong commitment to the 
homeland.  
 
 
2. The Albanian American response to the NATO airstrikes and the refugee 
crisis in Kosovo:  
 
The history that led to the UCK-uprising and the NATO air campain is 
well known. The roots behind the Albanian organization lay in a tiny Enverist 
opposition set up in Switzerland at the beginning of the 1980s64. Although some 
UCK structures emerged as early as 1993, operations on the field – murders of 
Serbian police and of Albanians suspected of “collaboration” with Serb 
authorities – did not become significant until 1996. It took one more year – and 
the rampage of arms depots in Albania following the collapse of the so-called 
“pyramids” and a deep state crisis - before uniformed and masked UCK fighters 
made their first public appearance at a funeral on November 17, 1997. At that 
time, though, they remained poorly equipped and small in numbers. A 
qualitative shift was to occur after the Serb police murdered Adem Jashari and 
most of his extended family (fifty-eight people) in Donji Prekaz, a Drenica village 
on March 4, 1998.  
 
News of Serb repression spurred quick reaction on the part of the Clinton 
administration. On March 9 and March 25, the six-nation Contact group - 
comprising the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia - was 
convened to discuss the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright, a proponent of a strong warning to Milosevic, emphasized 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Freedom Fighters Memorialized”, The Bronx Times, March 14, 2002, 
http://www.bxtimes.com/news/2002/0314/Boroughwide_News/040.html.  
63
 These figures were given by general Wesley Clark at Royal Regency Hotel in Yonkers – the place where 
thie initial gathering of the Brigade to be had taken place  - when he was invited to present his book 
Waging Modern War. For further details on the offensive and the air support it received from NATO, see 
Hajzari, Isuf, “Gen. Wesley Clark Receives a Hero’s Welcome in New York”, July 2, 2001 on the Web at: 
http://www.alb-net.com/pipermail/albsa-info/2001-August/002092.html  
64On the origins on the UCK, see Judah, Tim, Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000; Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-99: From the 
Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities, Cambridge: International 
Documents and Analysis Publishing, 2000; Garton Ash, Timothy, “Le Kosovo en valait-il la peine?”, Le 
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how serious the issue might become65. In London, renewed sanctions against 
Yugoslavia were envisioned. Meanwhile, in the House, Rep. Benjamin Gilman, 
Rep. Eliot Engel, along with Reps. Sue Kelly (R-NY) and Jim Moran (D-VA), co-
authored a resolution (H.Con.Res. 235) “calling for new sanctions against 
Yugoslavia, United Nations Security Council consideration of the Kosova crisis, 
and a strengthened U.S. and international presence in Kosova” – which was 
finally passed by the House on March 28, 1998 (406 vs. 1 votes)66. Besides, 
twenty-two congressmen wrote a letter to President Clinton in which they stated 
that: “We are gratified to hear the recent statements made by Madeleine Albright 
that ‘we are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in 
Kosova what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia’. (…) However, we 
believe that such declarations must be backed up with concrete actions”67. On 
March 31, 1998, the United Nations passed resolution 1160, imposing a new arms 
embargo on Yugoslavia68.  
 
Around the same period, the UCK-leadership in the Swiss diaspora – 
which did not originally intend to engage in a large-scale offensive until 1999 – 
decided to use the unexpected window of opportunity to start progressing from 
its bases in northern Albania into Kosovo where bits of territories were “freed”. 
Its advance was made possible by the weavering response of Belgrade. After 
several months of hesitation, Miloseivc’s regime was to opt for a full-blown 
repression in July 1998. Yet Kosovar civilians were to be the first targets of the 
Summer 1998 counterinsurgency operations, as the guerilla combattants 
preferred to withdraw rather than suffer a certain defeat. The Serb special forces 
burned the villages they “cleaned” of rebel presence. By October 1998, about 
200,000 Albanians have been forced to abandon their homes and the UCK 
structures were on the verge of collapse. With the support of Madeleine Albright 
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through sustained pressure. If we want more progress, we have to stick together to maintain that pressure. 
For if we give President Milosevic even a glimmer of a hint that he has done enough, he will most 
assuredly do nothing more. If we settle for half-measures, all we will get are half-measures (…)Think of all 
the peace plans that were advanced during the Bosnian war. How many times did one party or another 
appear to accept our proposals, only to walk away? We saw then that in the former Yugoslavia, promises 
mean little until they are implemented with safeguards. Incentives tend to be pocketed; warnings tend not to 
be believed. Leaders respond not to the distant threat of sanctions, but to the reality of sanctions”.  For the 
full text of the intervention, see “Statement by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the Contact 
Group Meeting on Kosova in Bonn”, at: http://www.kosova.com/r980326a.htm 
66
 In the USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1998, the H Con Res 235 is described as calling “for 
a range of steps to resolve the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, including sanctions against the government of 
Serbia and Montenegro, intensification of efforts by the International Contact Group in support of a 
resolution of the conflict, and unspecified measures "to promote human rights and democratic government 
throughout Serbia and Montenegro”. Yet, as a "Sense of the Congress" resolution, it does have the force of 
law.  
67
 Quoted in “Engel Calls for No-fly-zone in Kosova; Requiests Meeting with President Clinton”, 
http://www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9803/msg00149.html 
68
 For further details on resolution 1160, see note 71. 
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and thanks for the mediating role of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the Clinton 
administration then brokered a cease-fire and decided to deploy an international 
observer mission. NATO leaders had threatened the use of airtstrikes in case the 
Serb leader refused to withdraw some of its special security forces. The UCK 
used this pause to reinvestigate part of the territory it had abandoned in the Fall 
and led a series of small-scale attacks against Serb security forces.  
 
Against this background, the January 15, 1999 Raçak massacre of about 
forty-five pesant farmers came a watershed. To most international observers it 
signaled that the Serb regime would not change its repressive course. On January 
19, a new peace plan was discussed by Secretary of state, Madeline Albright and 
President Clinton’s top aides, while NATO airstrikes were once again threatened. 
A last ditch attempt at international mediation started in Rambouillet on 
February 6, 1999. Initially sceptical, the Albanian delegation finally approved a 
three-year-temporary deal that included deployment of international forces in 
Kosovo and did not explicitly rule out independence during the March-second 
round of talks. But the Serb delegation did not. On March 24, NATO finally 
launched operation Allied Force. The decision was to convince Serb leaders to 
move ahead with ethnically cleansing Kosovo. Within a matter of days, 800,0000 
Albanians were driven from their homes and forced to seek refuge in 
neighboring countries, Macedonia and Albania in the first place. Within Kosovo 
itself, about 500,000 persons were internally displaced.  
 
None of the Allied forces had anticipated a refugee crisis on such a large 
scale. Initially, the US hesitated on the best response. The Clinton administration 
was reluctant to accept large numbers of refugees for fear it might signal to the 
Serbs acceptance of the “ethnic cleansing” underway, but at the same time it was 
willing to relieve pressure on the improvised refugee camps in Macedonia. US 
officials first came up with a plan that envisioned housing Kosovar refugees at 
the US Guantanamo Bay military base in Cuba. The move was heavily criticized 
by several congressmen as well as think tanks and human rights organizations - 
being confined in a prision-like camp was definitely not the best option69. Several 
technical difficulties also argued against the original proposal: The US 
administration had a hard time finding Albanian-speakers ready to abandon 
their work and family for an unknown number of weeks to settle in Cuba and 
assist with the refugees.  
 
On April 21, 1999, a decision was finally made to resettle 20,000 Kosovars 
in five large cities with a strong Albanian population – New York, Boston, 
Detroit, Chicago and Newark, NJ. Priority went to refugees with relatives in the 
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 This protest is alluded to in Kranish, Michael and Mary Leonard, “State may be desitnation for refugees. 
Policuy aims to unite ethnic Albanian with Americans relatives”, The Boston Globe, April 22, 1999. 
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United States, followed by the “vulnerable” – the mothers and the sick -70. Being 
granted refugee status under the emergency consultation provision (INA, 
§207(b))71, the Albanians coming from Macedonian camps received a social 
security number and were thus allowed to work in the U.S. They were also 
eligible to food stamps and welfare benefits. And although they were expected to 
return to the Albanian province once it was safe, their status allowed them to 
apply for permanent residence after one year in the United States. Still, US 
official policy stressed that those willing to go home would be encouraged to do 
so, including financally – with transportation being arranged by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM)72. In practice, the first wave of refugees 
reached Fort Dix, New Jersey where a temporary Refugee Processing Center had 
been set up on May 5, 199973. All in all, in FY 1999 only 15,825 out of the 20,000 
anticipated Kosovo-Albanians were admitted in the US, before being resettled 
across the nation with the help of US federal agencies and Albanian-American 
humanitarian associations74.  
 
 
Table - Refugee Admission Ceilings 1996-2000 
 
Region FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 
Africa 7,000 7,000 7,000 12,000 18,000 
East Asia 25,000 10,000 14,000 9,000 8,000 
                                                           
70By comparison, Switzerland accepted about 50,000 and Germany 14,614 refugees. Quoted in Cota, 
Lulzim, “Albania Nixes Forces Return of Refugees”, May 21, 2000, United Press International. 
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 Refugee resettlement is legally regulated by the 1980 Refugee Act, which incorporated into American 
law the international definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), amended by the 
Refugee Act of 1980, includes a provision for emergency situations. Before being used for the Kosovo-
Albanians in 1999, this provision had been applied three times - in 1980 by President Carter for 3,500 
reugees from Cuba; in 1988 by President Reagan for 15,000 refugees from Eastern Europe and in 1989 by 
President Bush for an additional 22,500 refugees, mostly from the USSR. 
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 The refugees arrived in the United States by July 31, 1999 –that is, 11,200 people – were eligible for a 
special US return home program, in case they accepted to leave by May 1, 2000. By December 3, 1999, 
2,748 (25%) had made use of that opportunity to return to postwar Kosovo. Figures quoted in 98-668: 
Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy: Facts and Issues at : 
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Population/pop-6.cfm 
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 Out of this number, 4,050 went through Fort Dix. The refugee center of the camp was closed on July 16, 
2001.  
74About $100 million were provided for resettling Kosovar refugees in the United States (plus additional 
funds for transporting them there). See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act - “Making emergency 
supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes”. 
H.R.1141 sponsored by Rep. Young, Became Public Law No: 106-31 on May 21, 1999. 
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Europe 
(total) 
-Former 
Yugoslavia 
45,000 
 
48,000 
(18,000) 
51,000 
(25,000) 
61,000 
(25,000) 
47,000 
(17,000) 
-NIS/Baltic  (30,000) (26,000) (23,000) (20,000) 
-Kosovar 
Albanians 
   (13,000) (10,000) 
Latin 
America/C
aribbean 
6,000 4,000 4,000 3,000 3,000 
Near 
East/Asia 
4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 8,000 
Unallocated 3,000 5,000 3,000 2,000 6,000 
Total 
ceilings 
90,000 78,000 83,000 91,000 90,000 
Actual 
Admissions 
75,682 70,085 77,056 85,006 NA 
 
Source: 98-668: Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy: Facts and Issues at : 
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Population/pop-6.cfm 
 
The initial reactions of the Albanian-Americans to news about the 
bombings were understandibly positive75. Yet as information kept on arriving 
about relatives who had disappeared, the need for some form of collective action 
was felt. Albanian-American community leaders, however, were originally 
critical of the US relocation program. They argued that it was tantamount to 
supporting Milosevic’s policies and to turning a blind eye to the ill-treatment of 
the refugees by the Macedonian government. Also Albanian-Americans worried 
that the refugees might not be able to return to their destroyed home soon76. But, 
once the influx of refugees started, a flurry of initiatives was deployed that relied 
on family networks as well as church infrastructures. Internet sites were set up to 
help locate the refugees across Europe and the US77. A national Kosovo refugee 
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 Several media features have reported on the Albanian American reactions to the bombing. See among 
others, Grunwald, Michael, “Praying for Safety of Military; Albanian Americans Grateful for Strikes”, 
Washington Post, March 26, 1999. 
76
 For further details, see Harden, Blaine, “Crisis in the Balkans. Immigrants. Kosovars relocated to US 
would be Eligible to remain”, The New York Times, April 23, 1999. 
77One of them was www.web-depot.com-kosovo. It was set up by a Cambridge-based Albanian computer 
engineer. For further information, see Hayward, Ed, “Kosovo crisis – Cambridge-Web site creator hopes to 
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hotline was established (800-727-4420). The Albanian Orthodox Archdiocese in 
America created a Kosovo Relief Fund and offered clothes, aid in finding housing, 
as well as psychological support. It worked alongside the New England Albanian 
Relief Organization (NEARO) in sending food, medecine and clothing to the 
Kosovoar refugees in the Albania camps. Given their more limited strength, the 
Albanian Catholics turned to larger Church structures with more experience at 
handling immigration and the federal government. Similar initiatives were 
undertaken by the Albanian Islamic Centers across the country.  
 
Interestingly enough, in the US media, the stress was laid on the fact that, 
although most of the refugees were Muslim, religion was not considered a 
problem by the Albanian Orthodox and Catholic charity organizations78. 
Attempts at dowplaying the impact of religion stemmed both from Albanian 
community leaders – the purpose was to show will and unity – and from the 
American press. Very few are the articles that underlined the role played by 
Islamic solidarity in providing help for the refugees. Although the mostly-
Kosovar-based Muslim structures were no less active in creating Kosovo-related 
funds, their part was hadly ever mentioned.  A similar display of unity was 
emphasized during the numerous rallies and marches organized in Washington. 
  
 
3.Supporting US intervention: Advocacy in action and the limits of the 
Albanian-American lobby 
 
Beside establishing the Atlantic Brigade and providing assistance to the 
refugees, the Albanian-American community set out to get mobilized in two 
other ways during the Spring 1999 NATO air campaign. The first realm of 
activity had to do with publicly voicing support for the bombardments and with 
pressing the Congress and the US administration to arm the UCK as well as send 
troops on the ground during rallies. The second, with intensifying direct contacts 
with State department officials.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reunite Kosovo Kin”, The Boston Herald, April 13, 1999. Created as an international forum for Albanian 
students and professionals, http://www.alb-net.com also provided informaiton about the conflict as wel as 
the refugee location.   
78
 See, for instance, O’Brien, Ellen, “Mas. Albanians Back Intervention. Crisis in Kosovo. Serbs go on the 
Attack. Local Reaction”, The Boston Globe, March, 28, 1999; Ellement, John, “Kosovo Refugees Coming 
to Massachussets. Catholic Charities to Help with Effort”, The Boston Globe, April 24, 1999; Davis, 
William, “The Albanian Next door. Longtime Balkan  Community in South Boston finds itself in Spotlight 
with Kosovo Crisis”, The Boston Globe, May 10, 1999.  
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Demonstrations started shortly after the beginnings of the airstrikes79. 
They were typically coordinated either by the Albanian American Civic League 
(AACL) or by the National Albanian American Council (NAAC). Both 
endeavored to guarantee participation of Congressmen supportive of the Kosovo 
intervention, Rep. E. Engel (D-NY), Rep. T. Lantos (D-Calif.), Sen. J.Lieberman 
(D-Conn.), Sen. M. McConnell (R-KY)80, former Sen. Bob Dole and Rep. J. 
Traficant (D-Ohio), in the first place. While NAAC did not publicly raise the 
issue of independence for Kosovo, the slogan figured high on the AACL agenda 
during the marches in Washington, in New York and in other US cities with 
significant Albanian population. For both organizations, however, timing was 
important. The demonstrations were supposed to coincide with discussions of 
major resolutions in the House of representatives and in the Senate. The first of 
these events took place on March 30. A 3,000 Albanian-American protest was 
organized by the AACL outside the Yugoslav mission at 67th street and Fifth 
Avenue, after a march from the United Nations. While welcoming the bombings, 
the demonstrators called for ground troops to support the airstrikes. Two days 
later, on April 1, 1999, a rally in Chicago brought together about 500 Albanian 
Americans who also insisted on the need to deploy ground troops in case 
Miloševi• refused to yield81. These were followed by similar protests in Detroit, 
Los Angeles and Washington – typically across the White house, in Lafayette 
Park.  
 
As the weeks went by and reports of continued “ethnic cleansing” kept 
flowing with little hope that the Serb authorities might concede defeat, the 
Congress started feeling uneasy about the White House’s strategy. Some critics 
denounced the risk of a war of attrition. While the US public opinion remained 
on average supportive of the NATO-led operation82, anti-war activists mustered 
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 Some protests were also organized by the Serb American community in Washington and across the 
country, notably in Michigan and in California. But they were on average more modest in size and did not 
arouse much attention on the part of the US media. Also the Serbian American community was slower in 
getting organized to oppose the bombings. One of the driving forces behind the mobilization was the 
International Action Center, a peace-NGO with a  strong pro-Serb bent. One of the largest “anti-war” 
protests took place at the pentagon on June 5, 1999. It was attented by about 30,000 people. For further 
information, see: http://www.truthinmedia.org/Kosovo/War/day74.html. For a list of the peace-protests, 
see: http://www.iacenter.org/natotrig.htm     
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 On April 21, 1999, Senators McConnell and Lieberman cosponsored a bill – S.846 - that would have 
authorized the President to give grants of up to $ 25 millions to the “interim government of Kosova” “to be 
used for training and support for the self-defense forces” to protect the civilian population in Kosovo 
“against armed aggression”. The bill proposal was referred to the Commitee on Foreign Relations, but 
never reached vote.  It came a week after  Rep. Engel had introduced a similar text in the House – H.R. 
1408 – which did not fare better. 
81
 See Jackson, Brian, “500 attend Rally, call for ground troops”, Chicago Sun-Times, April 1, 1999.  
82
 A survey of 1,014 adult Americans conducted between April 30 and May 2, showed that 58% favored 
“the United States being a poart of NATO air and missile attacks against  Serbian military targets in 
Yugoslavia”. Only 36% of the interviewees opposed the bombings. A majority (67%) also supported the 
idea of sending US ground troops  as part of a peacekeeping operation in the event of a peace agreement.  
When it came to determining who should “have final authority for deciding whether the United States 
should continue the current airstrikes in Yugoslavia – The Congress or President Clinton”, however, most 
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strength. On April 27, for instance, the Center for Constitutional Rights, a New 
York-based civil and human rights group, declared that the “war in Kosova is 
flatly illegal” and “violates both the U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter” since it 
was being waged without explicit congressional consent83. On Capitol Hill, those 
who wished to reascertain the prerogatives of Congress in foreign policy could 
not but empathize with similar statements. Meanwhile seventeen Congressmen 
(15 Republicans and 2 Democrats) filed a suit against President Clinton for 
violating the 1973 War Powers Act which requires Congress to declare war or 
otherwise authorize military action. 
 
Dissatisfaction was evidenced during a series of votes in the House of 
Representatives in the last week of April that failed to either declare war or 
support explicitly the bombardments (see Table - The US Congress and the 
NATO bombings in Kosovo: major resolutions introduced between January and 
June 1999 – esp. the failed votes on resolutions HJ RES. 44 and S.CON. RES. 21). 
Hoping to influence the outcome of the vote, the AACL led a demonstration on 
April 28 that followed a by-then ritual trajectory from the Capitol to the White 
house. It was attended by former US representative Joseph DioGuardi (D-N.Y.), 
Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) and Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) with about 
1,000 marchers - some brought by buses from New Jersey and New York84. A few 
days later, however, a proposed resolution by Sen. J. McCain that aimed to give 
President Clinton “all means necessary” to conduct and win the war  ((S.J. Res. 
20 - A joint resolution concerning the deployment of the United States Armed 
Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia) was watered down in Senate.  
 
 
Meanwhile the Albanian diaspora was trying to multiply meetings with 
National Security Council Advisor Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security 
Advisor Jim Steinberg, senior state department officials and members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff85. But, seen from Washington, Albanian messages appeared at 
times scattered and confusing. More importantly, until March 1999, the Clinton 
administration did not always know to whom to turn in order to locate the actual 
representatives of the Albanian-American community in the country and, 
especially, people with strong connections within the UCK. Its original 
reluctance towards the rebel group had left some stigma. US officials started 
feeling the need to make up for its lack of contact with the Army when the 
Albanian delegation in Rambouillet unexepectedly refused to sign the peace plan 
                                                                                                                                                                             
respondents privileged the first option (60% vs. 34%). For further details, see Holland, Keating, “Poll: 
Congress Should Have Authority over US Involvement in Kosovo”,  CNN, May 3, 1999. 
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 Quoted in Non-Violent Activists, http://www.warresisters.org/nva0599-4.htm 
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 See See Wheeler, Linda, “Marchers Strut Support for Independent kosovo”, The Wahington Post, April 
28, 1999. 
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 One such meeting, for example, took place at the White House on March 31, with representatives from 
NAAC and was attented by President Clinton. For further details, see http://www.naac.org/pr/1999/04-01-
99.html 
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during the first round of talks. While negociations were going into a short period 
of recess, former Senator Robert Dole, State Department official, Jim O’Brien, and 
a general from the Joint chiefs of Staff were sent to meet with the Albanians and 
convince them to reconsider their views. At the same time, Deputy National 
Security Advisor, Jim Steinberg, was meeting with the eigh-member board of the 
National Albanian American Council (NAAC) and asking them to use all their 
influence over the guerilla leadership86. Thus doing, the US contributed to 
enhancing the relative influence and prestige of an organization that was still 
very young and not fully structured at that time. In addition, the United States 
invited the UCK leaders to visit Washington and sought ways of establishing 
more regular relations with a still little-known group87.  
 
The search for immediate ties was significantly eased following the 
creation of the Provisional government of Kosova – Delegation to the United States88. 
The Office, which employed eight people and was financed by Homeland 
Calling, enjoyed official support from Hashim Tahçi and some of his close 
followers, chief among them, Ramush Haradinaj, who, like the head of the 
representation, Dino Asanaj, came from Pe•/Peja. From April onwards, it was to 
endeavor to centralize the lobbying efforts of the Albanian community in 
Washington by engaging in a variety of activities – media contacts, exchanges of 
views with American think tanks, interaction with other diasporas (notably the 
Muslim diaspora from Bosnia), talks with US officials, etc. These efforts, 
however, were not always successful as some forms of rivalry persisted with 
older organizations like the AACL, Vatra or even NAAC.    
 
On the basis of the above discussion, how can one assess the influence of 
the Albanian American community over the handling of the Kosovo crisis by the 
Clinton administration? The initial reaction of the US governement to news 
about the emergence of the UCK – it is well known - was rather negative. In 
February 1998, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, then Special Representative of the 
President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, had described the guerilla as "terrorists", showing the Clinton 
Administration’s initial reservations towards the Albanian rebels89. Christopher 
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 This meeting was followed by a trip to Rambouillet by some NAAC members to meet with the Albanian 
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Hill, US Ambassador to Macedonia and one of the architects of the Rambouillet 
agreement, also shared this analysis. In addition, a US State Department report 
issued in January 1999 (based on data from the US Observer Mission) stated that 
“the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the police, ... KLA 
representatives had threatened to kill villagers and burn their homes if they did 
not join the KLA”90. The change of mood was to be rather slow and strongly 
aided by Serbia’s unrelenting repressive policies and selection of civilian targets. 
How much can be attributed to the Albanian-American diaspora?  
 
When addressing this question, one needs to bear in mind several facts. 
First, the definition of the US policy line towards the Serb province always 
included a variety internal and external factors that went much beyond 
questions of Albanian human rights in Kosovo. To some extent, it may even be 
argued that these were second to other considerations – like the future of the US 
leaderhisp in the post-cold war world, the evolution of transatlantic relations 
and the definition of US national interests. The fear that the crisis might spill 
over and turn into a major destabilizing factor in South East Europe was also 
prominent in shaping the Clinton administration’s course towards Kosovo. Of 
particular salience was the wish to avoid repeating the mistakes made in Bosnia 
where failure to use force early enough had led to a major humanitarian 
disaster. For this latter reason, Kosovo stood high on Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright’s personal agenda, and there is little doubt that she was one 
of the major driving forces behind the adoption of a higher profile by the US 
administration. Domestics concerns were not foreign either to Clinton’s ultimate 
choice to resort to force. Obsessed with opinion polls, the US President also 
needed to divert attention from the Monica Lewinski affair and to bolster his 
image as effective leader. In brief, there is no way the Albanian diaspora might 
have “convinced” the US government to intervene in Kosovo were it not for the 
interwining of these various motives.   
 
Where the Albanian American diaspora might have made a difference, 
however, is in Congress. As suggested earlier, Joe DioGuardi’s AACL was 
instrumental in bringing the attention of the legislative branch to developments 
in Kosovo. As a time when the Congress was inclined to demonstrate its say in 
foreign affairs, this sensibilization to Albanian-related issues did have an impact. 
But this was long before the 1999 bombardments. And even then, several 
nuances need to be introduced. In the first place, the role of the so-called 
“Albanian lobby” needs to be ascertained against the background of other ethnic-
based mobilizations – notably that of the Greek American diaspora or the Serb 
diaspora. In his assessment of US policymaking towards Yugoslavia between 
                                                           
90
 Quoted in KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of 
South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, December 21, 1998; 
Compiled by EUR/SCE (202-647-4850) from daily reports of the U.S. element of the Kosovo diplomatic 
Observer Mission, December 21, 1998. 
 36 
1989 and 1996, former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, suggests 
that, despite stronger numbers – nearly one million in the United States, he 
argues – “Serbian-Americans were not particularly influential (…). The reason 
was probably that they were divide over whether to support Miloševi•, who was 
both a Communist and a nationalist”91. Yet a fuller assessment of the contribution 
of Serb-Americans – and Greek-Americans - to US policies in the Balkans 
remains to be conducted92.     
 
Second, although the presence of renowned congressmen supportive of 
action in Kosovo did help, it proved unsufficient to translate into robust 
Congress support for the entire duration of the air campaign. Other more salient 
variables influenced the representatives’ and the senators’ policy preferences. 
The so-called “Vietnam syndrome” was one of them, although its ultimate effect 
was complex since it invited contrasted conclusions on whether or how the 
Kosovo war needed to be conducted. While former Navy pilot, Sen. John McCain 
(R-AZ) concluded from his experience in Vietnam that no war could be waged 
under severe constraints and therefore favored giving President Clinton free 
room to maneuver, Sen. Robert Kerrey (B-NE) and Sen. Max Cleland (D-GA) 
vehemently opposed risking a new Vietnam-like entanglement93. More 
importantly, when, after several weeks of bombings, more and more 
Congressmen became critical of the Administration’s ill-defined goals, lack of 
exit strategy and disregard of the regulatory powers of the Congress, the 
supporters of the “Albanian cause” were unable to reverse the tide. For many a 
Senator and a Representative, the prestige and the influence of Congress over 
policymaking were stakes that ranked much higher on the agenda than the tiny 
Kosovo war-torn province per se.   
 
At that moment, though, Albanian demonstrations across the country 
might have been instrumental in keeping the public aware of the humanitarian 
and moral issues at stake in what might have otherwise appeared as a far-away 
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and somewhat obscure conflict. While evidencing the ability of the Albanian 
American community to remain mobilized, the marches and rallies may thus 
have helped US decision-makers to convince average American tax-payers that 
the air campaign needed to be continued action until a peaceful settlement was 
reached. At a time when opinion polls were one of the few indicators the White 
House might oppose to the growing discontent on the part of Congress, the more 
vocal the demonstrations of support the better. 
 
For those who would be intent of magnifying the potence of the 
“Albanian lobby”, a consideration at the evolutions undergone by US policies 
towards Kosovo since the end of the war might have a sobering effect. Even well 
before the elections of George W. Bush to the Presidency, a reconsideration of the 
US’s foreign policy priorities was in order. One year afer the bombings, most 
refugees have returned home and some kind of peace had been established in 
Kosovo. In Congress, there was a growing feeling that the US had done their part 
and that more responsibilities, including financial, should fall onto the EU’s 
shoulders. In May 2000, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted 
overwhelmingly (23 to 3) to require congressional approval for United States 
pecekeepers to stay in Kosovo beyond July 2001, showing its concern about an 
open-ended deployment. US soldiers made up 5,900 of the 37,000 NATO-led 
peacekeepers. The provision threatening withdrawal of US troops sponsored by 
Senators Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) and John Warner (R-Virginia) and 
chairman of the Senate Armes Service was narrowly rejected. In March, the 
House has been at pain to rebuke a similar amendment which would have 
withheld 25% of the money for Kosovo unless the President certified by July 15 
that European countries were living up to their promises to provide 
reconstruction money for the province.  
 
As the Balkans receded into the background, the stress was more than 
ever laid on questions of stability. In this context, the idea of independence for 
Kosovo could not garner much support. With what has become its dominant 
motto, the Albanian-American community in the United States cannot have the 
ear of the US Congress. And even among the legislators that had supported the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, very few are those who were willing to go as far 
as to publicly ask for a US stand on the issue.  The Fall of Slobodan Miloševi• in 
Serbia on October 5, 2000 and the change in administration following the election 
of President George W. Bush have closed down whatever window of 
opportunity might have been shortly opened. In addition, a turnover in 
personnel has also occurred in the House and the Senate that has weakened the 
circle of Albanian proponents: Joe DioGuardi, who has always failed to be 
reelected since 1989, is no longer as influential as he used to be and former 
Senator Bob Dole, who did not get reelected after his 1996 failed presidential bid, 
is by now less active in politics. More diversified contacts may need to be 
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established by Albanian Americans and a greater cohesion achieved in order to 
be able to exert some level influence over the current Bush administration.  
 
 Can a evolution in this direction be anticipated? Although there is no 
wonder that the Albanian Americans have learned a lot in terms of organization, 
mobilizing and access to US decision-makers over the 78-days of NATO 
bombings in Yugoslavia, it is too early to determine how muc will remain of this 
experience. On December 31, 1999, the Provisional Government of Kosova was 
closed down. Its major animators, Dino Asanaj and Shinasi Rama have since then 
withdrawn from politics.  To some extent, its seems that the influence of the 
former UCK in the US-based diaspora was shortlived. There are several reasons 
for this. First, once the war was over, average Albanians Americans aspired to 
return to their business as usual and, in particular, to help their relatives and 
families back in Kosovo rebuild their homes and start a new life. The warlike 
rhetoric of former USK-supporters was no longer appealing. Support for the 
rebel army did not translate into an automatic endorsement of Hashim Thaçi’s 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK, Partia demokratike e Kosovës). As for 
Ramush Haradinaj, the former commander of the Pe•/Peja region and now 
leader of the Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK, Aleanca për ardhmërine e 
Kosovës), he has turned to Joe DioGuardi and Shirley McCloyes to act as his PR 
consultants for the US. Yet, in the New York area, the LDK is once again the most 
visible political actor. Homeland Calling has been transformed into the Friends of 
Kosova Protection Force (Miqte e TMK), whose head remains Shefki Mexhuani, but 
its resources and influence are now much more limited. Uk Lushi and several 
other soldiers from the former Atlantic Brigade have decided to set up a veteran 
organization, but their range of activities is inward-oriented and limited.  
 
This does not mean that memories from the time of the war will go easily. 
Nor that most Albanian American organizations are likely to face a new identity 
crisis, but rather that one period is over and new goals need to be set up. Some of 
them have well understood that time has come for economic reconstruction in 
the Balkans and that the call of the day will be for greater Western investments in 
Kosovo and Albania. Likely to be most influential in the future are those that will 
be able to present themselves as key intermediaries between the United States 
and their homeland in the development of successful business projects. This 
seems to be the ambition of 32-year-old senior managing director of Bear Stearns 
Richard Lukaj, the new head of NAAC.  
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